Group Liability under Indian Penal Code,1860.

Group Liability under Indian Penal Code

Introduction and Explanation of the Section :

Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code,1860, addresses those who come together to commit a crime. Section 34 of IPC is designed to handle situations when it is impossible to differentiate from the actions of sole members of the party or to establish precisely what role each of them played. If the purpose or objective is shared, then the responsibility must be shared as well. As a result, the common belief that the more people there are, the less guilty they are has no legal application to the act or commission of a crime. As a matter of fact, Section 34 discourages "group criminals." Section 34 must be applied with both common intention and participation. A shared intention necessitates a prearranged plan, a previous concert, or a prior meeting of minds. As a result, there is a shared purpose, which needs to be improved when several people have similar intentions. It should be noted that common intention can be formed suddenly and impulsively, but the plan must come before the act that constitutes the offense.
The phrase "in furtherance of common intention" implies that section 34 applies even if the act performed is not precisely the act jointly intended by the conspirators to be completed. The common intention may be to perform an action, and another step may be performed in support of common sense.IPC Section 34 and Section 149 represent the rule of constructive liability which means that an individual is responsible for the repercussions of another person's amendment. Still, Section 34 and Section 149 should never be mixed around each other.
According to Section 141, any gathering of five or more people is unlawful , if the people who make up that assembly share a common goal- 

Clause 1: To overawe by criminal force or display of unlawful power (When one person restrains another via awe, terror, or superior influence, he is said to overawe him).
Clause 2: To oppose the execution of any law or legal action (Any opposition to the carrying out of any law's provision or the execution of the legal procedure is considered criminal)
Clause 3: To cause mischief, commit criminal trespass, or commit any other offense (Offenses here refer to anything that is punished under the code or any other law) 
Clause 4: Using criminal force or by the display of criminal power ( No one may use unlawful force to exercise his or her right to hold property.)
Clause 5: To compel any individual via the use of criminal force or the display of unlawful force (The most important factor is compelling someone else ) 
An assembly that was lawful at the outset turned unlawful when one of them called on others to assault members of the opposing party and they, in reaction, began to chase the members of the opposing party who were fleeing.

Analysis of the Case: The IRAC Method

The question of common purpose is a matter of fact. Although subjective, it may be deduced from facts and situations. As a result, simply being at the site of a crime does not automatically imply complicity in the act. The shooting of a mistaken guy or a sentry might be considered in furtherance of a shared goal. The conduct should not be extraneous to or contrary to the shared aim.
The well-known case law Mizaji v. State of Uttar Pradesh supports the explanation.

Brief Facts of the Case:

Mizaji, Machal, Tejsingh, Subedar, and Maiku filed an appeal with the Allahabad High Court under criminal appeal number 1809 of 1957, challenging the decision of the Court of Sessions at Farukhabad in a sessions trial. Mizaji and other accused defendants convicted of life imprisonment received the death penalty from the Sessions Court. On 27.7.1957, Rameshwar was murdered by Mizaji (charged). The five defendants, Mizaji, Tejsingh, Subedar, Machal, and Maiku, entered the Sukhna field with the shared purpose of forcibly taking possession of it at whatever cost, including murder. While both parties were disputing, Mizaji drew his revolver and fired on Rameshwar, who fell and died an hour later. Ramsaroop, Jailal, and Israel went to the police station and filed a complaint against all five of the accused.

Issue (I):  

1. Is it conceivable that the murder occurred while the familiar object was being prosecuted, i.e., in line with Section 34? 
2. Was the common object of forcible possession present?
3. Is section  141 and 149 of the IPC relevant in this case?

Rule (R ):

If five or more people do wrongdoing with a common goal, each person's culpability is the same as if he did it alone - this is known as 'Group Liability.' Section 34 of the IPC of 1860 is used. Section 34 deals with situations in which an offense necessitates a specific criminal purpose or knowledge and is committed by a group of people.
Each of them who participates in the act with such knowledge or purpose is responsible in the same way as if it were done alone by him with that intention or knowledge.

Analysis (A):

They all had the same goal: to take over the land forcibly. As a result, they are all charged with the same aim of forced possession under Section 34,141 and149 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.Rameshwar was killed by the Mizaji. Mizaji was charged with illegal assembly, everyday objects to take forcible possession, and murdering Rameshwar. He was given the death penalty. Except for Mizaji, everyone else (Tej Singh, Subedar, Machal, and Maiku) was charged with illegal assembly, an everyday object to take forcible possession of land under Section 149 of IPC, 1860. They were condemned to live in prison. The Allahabad HC determined that this case fell within the second portion of Sections 141 and 149 of the IPC due to the weapons with which the participants of the illegal assembly were equipped and their behavior, which demonstrated the lengths to which they were willing to go to achieve their shared goal.

Conclusion (C ):

To summarise, if the everyday object to commit an offense differed from the offense actually committed, the member not actually committing the offense would be responsible for such a violation only if he or she understood that such crime was likely to be executed during the prosecution of the everyday object. Section 34 is a rule of evidence that establishes shared liability. The purpose of an unlawful gathering may be the same, but the intentions of its participants may differ. Thus, if the accused arrived equipped with lethal weapons, it was reasonable that they were aware that death was likely to result from the prosecution of the everyday object. However, no common purpose to kill could be determined.